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How does the formation of cross-country teams affect the organization of work
and the structure of wages? To study this question, we propose a theory of the
assignment of heterogeneous agents into hierarchical teams, where less skilled
agents specialize in production and more skilled agents specialize in problem
solving. We ﬁrst analyze the properties of the competitive equilibrium of the
model in a closed economy, and show that the model has a unique and efﬁcient
solution. We then study the equilibrium of a two-country model (North and
South), where countries differ in their distributions of ability, and in which agents
in different countries can join together in teams. We refer to this type of integra-
tion as globalization. Globalization leads to better matches for all southern work-
ers but only for the best northern workers. As a result, we show that globalization
increases wage inequality among nonmanagers in the South, but not necessarily
in the North. We also study how globalization affects the size distribution of ﬁrms
and the patterns of consumption and trade in the global economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of recent technological
1 and institutional
2 devel-
opments have blurred the borders between national labor mar-
kets and have allowed for the formation of international teams.
These developments have altered what teams of agents can do at
a distance. Some tasks such as data entry in consumer banking,
software upgrades and maintenance, low-level customer handling
in call centers, or standardized manufacturing processes, are now
frequently done offshore. Other, more knowledge-intensive, tasks
(such as data manipulation, software development, higher-end
sales and service, and R&D and product design in manufacturing
industries) continue to be undertaken domestically. Broadly, rou-
tine tasks are offshored, while more complex tasks are done
domestically. Thus, the traditional vertical division of labor
within a team, whereby some low skill agents (workers) under-
* We thank several colleagues and seminar participants at various institu-
tions, as well as the Editor and two anonymous referees for very useful comments.
1. Improvements in information technology have reduced the cost of inter-
national data and voice transfer from prohibitively expensive to levels that are
virtually identical to within-country communication costs.
2. Recent political and economic reforms in China, India, and Eastern Europe
have substantially liberalized economic activity. Meanwhile, the worldwide de-
regulation and competition in the telecommunications industry has contributed
substantially to the drop in communication costs.
© 2006 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
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31take routine tasks and the highest skill agents (managers) spe-
cialize in knowledge-intensive tasks, can now take place across
countries.
In our view, what is important about this new division of
labor is that it alters the feasible matches between agents’ skill
types. High skill agents in more developed countries can leverage
their knowledge at lower cost by working with cheaper labor on
routine tasks, and the better workers in less developed countries
are able to become part of international high value added teams.
In this paper we present a simple framework that puts agent
skill heterogeneity and matching at the center of the analysis. By
allowing us to analyze changes in matching and in the supporting
earnings functions, our framework allows us to examine the
impact of offshoring on wages, on occupational choices (produc-
tion versus knowledge jobs), and (as matches are “many-to-one”)
on the distribution of ﬁrm sizes.
We model an economy in which production requires physical
inputs and knowledge, and where a continuum of agents with
heterogenous abilities sorts into teams competitively. Agents of
different skill levels form teams. Less skilled agents (workers)
specialize in production work and deal with routine tasks; while
the most skilled agents specialize in knowledge-intensive tasks
(managers). Relative to less skilled managers, better managers
are able to increase more the productivity of all the workers in
their team, as they are able to solve a wider range of the problems
their team confronts in production. Better production workers
allow individuals to manage larger teams, as workers can solve
more problems by themselves and require less help. This results
in a complementarity between manager and worker ability that
determines the identity of agents working and managing differ-
ent teams. It also determines, through comparative advantage,
the occupational choice of agents. More able agents, although
more productive as production workers, want to set up their own
ﬁrms and manage their own teams of workers, instead of working
for other managers.
To study the impact of the formation of international teams
in this economy, we study a simple one-sector, two-country model
in which countries differ only in their skill distributions. In par-
ticular, one country, the North, has a distribution of skills with a
relatively high mean, while the other country, the South, has a
distribution of skills with a relatively low mean. In our model, the
“skill overlap” implied by these skill differences is captured by a
32 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSsingle parameter, which plays a crucial role in the analysis. The
other key parameter in our model is the cost of communicating
knowledge within teams (i.e., the state of communication tech-
nology), which determines the extent to which managers can
leverage their knowledge via larger teams.
We initially study the case in which cross-country teams are
prohibitively expensive, so that the equilibria in the North and in
the South correspond to those of two closed economies. We then
compare these equilibria to that of a perfectly integrated inter-
national economy, where cross-border teams are as expensive as
local ones. We refer to this type of integration as “globalization.”
We ﬁrst show that globalization leads to the formation of
international teams in which northern managers supervise teams
of southern workers: offshoring. Offshoring thus allows for the
geographic separation of production and problem solving, and the
delocation of physical production toward the South. It leads to the
creation of routine jobs and an increase in production in the
South, and to the creation of knowledge-intensive jobs, or ﬁrms,
and a decrease in production in the North. This implies that the
pattern of trade is such that the South is a net exporter of
physical goods, while the North is a net exporter of knowledge
services.
Globalization also affects the level and structure of earnings
of individuals, both in the North and in the South. We ﬁrst show
that our model is consistent with the empirical regularity that
southern workers employed in multinational ﬁrms receive wages
that are on average higher than those received by workers em-
ployed in domestic ﬁrms (see Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison
[1996] for empirical evidence). We next analyze how globalization
affects income inequality within each of the two countries. We
show that globalization leads to an increase in within-worker
wage inequality, that is wage inequality among nonmanagers, in
the South. This prediction is consistent with the ﬁndings of several
empirical studies (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson [1997], Goldberg and
Pavcnik [2004], and references therein). These ﬁndings have re-
ceived considerable attention in the international trade literature
since they cannot be easily rationalized with standard factor propor-
tions trade frameworks. Our theory predicts an increase in within-
worker inequality in the South as a result of changes in matching:
globalization improves the quality of the managers with whom
southern workers are matched, thus raising the productivity of
these workers, and thereby leading to an increase in their marginal
33 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYreturn to skill. This effect is reinforced by an occupational choice
effect: more agents become workers, hence increasing the range of
abilities in the worker skill distribution.
The effect on within-worker wage inequality in the North is
more complicated. On the one hand, low skill workers in the
North face increased competition from southern workers, and this
tends to reduce their marginal return to skill. On the other hand,
our model highlights a new force leading to an increase in within-
worker wage inequality in the North. When more low skill agents
are available, the time of high skill managers becomes more
scarce, and workers who are better able to economize on this time
become relatively more valuable. As a result, the value of more
skilled workers relative to less skilled ones increases, as does the
difference between the ability of the managers they are matched
with. When either the skill overlap or communication costs are
sufﬁciently low, so that high skill managers are particularly
valuable and scarce, this last effect dominates, and globalization
increases wage inequality not only in the South but also in the
North. Conversely, when communication costs and the skill over-
lap are sufﬁciently large, the former effect dominates, and off-
shoring is associated with lower wage inequality in the North.
This may help rationalize the ﬁndings of Feenstra and Hanson
[1996b, 1999] that offshoring raised wage inequality in the
United States in the 1980s but not in the 1970s. Our theory
suggests that these ﬁndings can be explained by lower commu-
nication costs and deeper trade integration with less developed
countries in the 1980s than in the 1970s.
3
Which ﬁrms engage in offshoring? When the skill overlap is
large and communication costs are high, only the most productive
and larger ﬁrms will engage in offshoring; while, when the skill
overlap is small and communication costs are low, the ﬁrms that
engage in offshoring will actually be the least productive ﬁrms,
those controlled by the lowest skill managers. More generally, we
show that the “quality” of offshoring, as measured by the average
skill level of the workers that form international teams relative to
the skill level of all southern workers, is weakly increasing in
both the skill overlap and communication costs. At the same time,
we show that the “quantity” of offshoring, as measured by the
3. The ability of our model to deliver the level of income for all agents in the
economy also allows us to identify the winners and losers from globalization. In
particular, in subsection IV.B we show that there is always a subset of workers
who are hurt by globalization.
34 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSproportion of southern workers who work for northern managers,
is instead weakly decreasing in both communication costs and the
skill overlap, and converges to zero as the skill distributions
completely overlap. We also study how occupational choices, the
size distribution of ﬁrms, and wage inequality are affected by
these same parameters.
One of the advantages of our approach is that offshoring is
not only the result of the relative aggregate supply of skills, but
rather follows from the competitive sorting of agents with differ-
ent skill levels into teams. Paraphrasing Sattinger [1993], wages
in the economy play an allocative role rather than simply being
rewards for the possession of particular characteristics. This al-
lows us to derive conclusions on the characteristics of offshoring
ﬁrms as well as on the distribution of wages. Most other efforts to
understand offshoring do not have this feature. Feenstra and
Hanson [1996a, 1997, 2003], for example, assume factor endow-
ments of skilled and unskilled workers in the North and South,
and a production function that uses these inputs to produce either
intermediate or ﬁnal goods.
4 In these models offshoring is the
result of foreign direct investment and leads to changes in wage
inequality as a result of changes in the sectoral composition of
production. Their work is important in that it determines the
changes in wages due to these sectoral (in inputs or output)
compositional changes.
5 In general, however, it is silent about
changes in wage inequality within narrowly deﬁned sectors as
well as on the cross-sectional characteristics of offshoring ﬁrms.
6
Our paper is closely related to the work of Grossman and
Maggi [2000] and Kremer and Maskin [2003], in that they also
study the relationship between patterns of trade and patterns of
matching between the skill of different workers.
7 Grossman and
4. Feenstra and Hanson [1997] assume that the supply of skill and unskilled
labor does respond to relative wages, but they do not model the occupational
choice decision or the sorting of agents into production teams.
5. Feenstra and Hanson [2003] stress that these changes in the sectoral
composition of production may occur within industries and may therefore not be
picked up by industry-level price indices (cf. Lawrence and Slaughter [1993]).
6. Other papers have developed frameworks with similar characteristics that
also abstract from the dimensions that we focus on: in particular, Acemoglu
[2003], Bernard, Robertson, and Schott [2004], Zhu and Treﬂer [2005], and Ver-
hoogen [2004].
7. Nocke and Yeaple [2004] present an assignment model of FDI, but focus on
the matching between brands of different quality and entrepreneurs of heteroge-
neous ability. Our paper is also related to a branch in the literature that has
stressed the importance of heterogeneity in understanding the differential impact
that globalization may have on different types of ﬁrms or workers (e.g., Manesse
35 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYMaggi consider the consequences of different types of production
functions involving substitutability or complementarity in skills
for the patterns of specialization and trade. A maintained as-
sumption in their analysis is that international teams are not
allowed to form.
Our work is more closely related to Kremer and Maskin
[2003], who study the patterns of trade and wages that result
from production functions that are characterized by complemen-
tarity between inputs and imperfect substitutability between
them. Consistent with any production function that may hope to
address within-worker wage inequality, the production function
we study involves skill complementarity, imperfect substitutabil-
ity between workers’ skill, and differential sensitivity to the skill
of different workers (see Kremer and Maskin [1997]). Our model,
however, is novel in four key dimensions. First, following Gari-
cano and Rossi-Hansberg [2005, 2004], it is the only one to involve
hierarchical one-to-many matching (rather than one-to-one
matching), where a manager is endogenously matched with a
potentially large number of workers, and can potentially raise the
output of all of them. Second, the identity of managers and
workers is endogenous and is the result of an occupational choice
decision. Third, the actual team production function results nat-
urally and endogenously from a production process that does not
assume skill complementarities, but rather derives them from the
specialization of agents in different aspects of the process—pro-
duction and knowledge. Fourth, the relation between the skill of
the manager and that of the worker is mediated by communica-
tion technology; that is, the state of communication technology
determines the extent to which a manager can leverage his
knowledge by communicating it to many or few production work-
ers. As a result of these differences, we are able to move beyond
previous contributions in formally analyzing how the process of
globalization interacts with the state of communication technol-
ogies in determining the worldwide organization of production
and the structure of rewards that support it.
8
and Turrini [2001], Melitz [2003], Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple [2004], Antra `s
and Helpman [2004], and Yeaple [2005]).
8. For previous equilibrium models of the allocation of heterogeneous agents
to hierarchical teams, but which do not involve matching between workers and
managers, see Lucas [1978], Rosen [1982], and Waldman [1984].
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in that we simplify the analysis by taking the skill level of agents
as exogenous, and we limit team sizes to two layers. The payoff
for this simpliﬁcation is that we provide a closed-form solution to
the model and, most importantly, we are able to study the rela-
tionship between matching and wage inequality across countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the basic framework for a closed economy and shows
existence, uniqueness, and optimality. Section III constructs an
equilibrium in the integrated economy and discusses its basic
properties. Section IV discusses the effects of economic integra-
tion or globalization. Section V presents comparative statics with
respect to communication costs and the skill overlap, and Section
VI concludes. All the proofs in the paper are relegated to the
Appendix.
II. THE MODEL
Agents are endowed with one unit of time and a skill level z.
The distribution of skills in the population is given by a cumula-
tive distribution function G(z), with density g(z), that for the
moment we will assume has support in [0,z ] with z   1. Agents
rank consumption according to a linear utility function, so they
are income maximizers, given that we normalize the price of the
only good in the economy to one.
Our theory of the organization of production follows Garicano
[2000]. Production is done by teams with one manager and pro-
duction workers. Workers spend their time producing. While
producing, they face a problem that has to be solved for produc-
tion to happen. If a worker knows the solution to her problem, she
solves it and produces one unit of output. If she does not know the
solution, she can ask her manager. If the manager knows the
solution to the problem, the manager solves it immediately, com-
municates the solution to the worker, and she produces one unit
of output. The manager spends 0  h  1 units of time commu-
nicating what she knows to the worker no matter if she knows the
solution to the problem or not. The skill level of an agent deter-
mines the set of problems she can solve. An agent with skill z can
solve all problems that require knowledge between 0 and z.W e
normalize the set of problems so that the skill level z is also the
37 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYproportion of problems an agent can solve.
9 Hence, a manager in
a team with n workers of skill zp faces the following time
constraint:
h1  zpn  1,
and so can deal with n(zp)  1/[h(1  zp)] workers.
10 Production
in a team formed by a manager with skill level zm and workers
with skill zp is therefore given by zmn(zp). Given wages, manag-
ers choose the ability of their workers to maximize rents,
11
(1) Rzm  max
zp
zm  wzpnzp  max
zp
zm  wzp
h1  zp ,
subject to
h1  zpn  1.





Agents choose whether to become managers or workers so as
to maximize their utility, that is, their income. Hence given their
ability z, they solve max {R(z), w(z)}. This implies that the
earnings function, the envelope of the wage and rent functions,
given occupational choices, will be continuous.
In equilibrium labor markets clear. Namely, at the equilib-
rium wages and earnings, the supply and demand of production
workers equalize at all skill levels. Let w be an equilibrium
wage function, and let the equilibrium occupational choice deci-
sion be such that agents with skill levels in [0,z*] become work-
ers and agents in [z*,z ] become managers. Agents with knowl-
9. The upper bound z  thus represents the fraction of problems that the
most-skilled agent in the economy can solve.
10. In principle, the interpretation of our technology given in the text re-
quires us to address the stochastic element in the arrival of problems, which could
result in congestion and queuing. Doing so would not, we believe, add to the
economics of the question at hand. An alternative interpretation, that circum-
vents the need to address these issues, is that each worker draws a continuum of
problems of measure one. Workers then solve the problems that they can, given
their skill level, and ask managers for help on the measure of problems that they
do not know how to solve. Then, h would be interpreted as the time cost for a
manager of helping on a measure one of problems.
11. Note also that we have assumed that a manager with ability zm hires
workers of homogeneous ability zp. In Antra `s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg
[2005] we generalize the technology and show that this assumption is without loss
of generality.
38 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSedge z* are indifferent. This restriction on equilibrium occupa-
tions turns out to be without loss of generality, as Theorem 1
below shows. Let m(z) be the skill level of the manager of a
worker with ability z. We prove in Theorem 1 that an equilibrium
allocation of this economy has to satisfy positive sorting and,









1zgzdz for all zp  z*,
where m
1(z) is the ability of the workers hired by a manager of
ability z. The left-hand side of this equation is the supply of
workers between 0 and zp. The right-hand side is the demand for
workers by managers between m(0)  z* and m(zp). Market
clearing is guaranteed when supply equals demand for every skill
level of workers zp  z*. Substituting for n and deriving with
respect to zp, we obtain that, as long as z  z* and m(z)i s
increasing (positive sorting),
(3) mz  h1  z
gz
gmz.
Notice that in this economy positive sorting is always guaranteed
because of the complementarity between workers’ and managers’
talent (see equation (1)). Hence, better workers always work for
better managers, a property we will exploit intensively below.
This differential equation, together with the two boundary con-
ditions m(0)  z* and m(z*)  z , determines the equilibrium
assignment function. Notice that the equilibrium assignment of
workers to managers can be determined without knowing wages
and rents once positive sorting is established.
12 Note also that
since managers lead teams with many workers, matching is
many-to-one. This implies that m, although single valued, has a
slope smaller than g(z)/g(m(z)), and so a given mass of workers
is matched with a smaller mass of managers.
12. Of course, equilibrium wages and rents sustain this assignment as an
equilibrium allocation. We can compute assignments independently of wages
since the span of control of managers is a technological restriction of the problem.
Managers add agents to their teams until they do not have any time left. If agents
could acquire skill, or could work by themselves, this helpful property of our
economy would be lost, and the analysis would be much more complicated.
Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg [2005, 2004] present closed economy frameworks
that incorporate these dimensions.
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by a wage function w, a rent function R, an assignment function
m, and occupational choice decisions (summarized by z*), such
that managers maximize rents ((2) is satisﬁed and w(z*) 
R(z*)),
13 agents maximize utility (w(z*)  R(z*)), and labor
markets clear ((3) is satisﬁed together with m(0)  z* and
m(z*)  z ). The following theorem shows that an equilibrium of
this economy exists as long as h is lower than a threshold h*.
14 It
also shows that, if an equilibrium exists, it is unique, efﬁcient,
exhibits positive sorting, and can be characterized by a threshold
z* as we have done so far. On top of this, we can show in general
that the earnings function max {R(z), w(z)} is strictly convex
in z.
THEOREM 1. There exists a threshold h*  0 such that if h 
[0,h*] there exists a unique competitive equilibrium of this
economy. In equilibrium the set of managers and the set of
workers are connected, the equilibrium exhibits positive sort-
ing, and the earnings function is strictly convex. Further-
more, the equilibrium allocation is efﬁcient.
II.A. Equilibrium in the Closed Economy
Consider a world formed by two independent economies
where agents can only form teams with other agents in the same
economy. The ﬁrst one, that we call the North, is exactly as
described before but with a uniform distribution of skills in the
population, GN(z)  z for z  [0,1], with density gN(z)  1. In
the North, the best agents of the economy can therefore solve all
the problems that arise in production. The second economy, that
we call the South, also has a uniform distribution of skills, but the
support of the distribution is the interval [0,] for 1, with
GS(z)  z/ for z  [0,], and density gS(z)  1/. The best
agents in the South can thus solve only a fraction  of the
problems that they face while producing. The North is, therefore,
13. The second condition is needed to guarantee that managers at z  do not
proﬁt from hiring agents with abilities slightly above z*. The condition is neces-
sary given that (2) only holds for z  (0,z*) but not for z*. Garicano and
Rossi-Hansberg [2005] show that this condition would always be satisﬁed if we
were to allow agents to produce individually as well as in teams.
14. The reason that we need to restrict h for an equilibrium to exist is that we
do not allow agents to be self-employed. If we were to allow them to work on their
own, we could guarantee existence for all 0  h  1. In the rest of the paper we
will analyze the case in which we specify the distribution of abilities to be a
piecewise uniform density, and in this case we can show that h*  0.85.
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are identical in all other respects, including population size. We
will often refer to the parameter  as the skill overlap. The choice
of a uniform assumption has the virtue of allowing us to solve the
whole model analytically.
15 It also implies that h*  0.85, and so
below we will focus only on h  [0,0.85].
The northern economy is just a special case of the southern
economy when  is equal to 1. Hence, we start by describing an
equilibrium in the South. All the expressions are identical for the
North if we substitute 1. Using (3) and the boundary condi-
tion mS(0)  z* S, we obtain that
(4) mSz  z* S  hz1  1⁄2 z,
and, using mS(z* S)  , we can solve for the threshold ability z* S:
(5) z* S 
1  h  1  h
2  2h1  
h .
That is, all agents with skill between 0 and z* S become workers,
and all agents with skill between z* S and  become managers. It
is easy to show that z* S increases as communication technology
improves; that is, as h declines. Intuitively, now managers can
have larger teams, so in equilibrium there are fewer managers
and more workers. In an economy with more skilled agents,
larger , z* S is higher. There are two forces that determine this
effect. First, as  increases and therefore the density 1/ de-
creases, given the size of teams, agents with higher skill decide to
become workers. Second, the best agents manage larger teams,
which reduces the set of managers and increases the set of work-
ers. Thus, an economy with higher  or lower h is an economy in
which the skill levels of the agents that become workers is more
15. The distribution of skills across countries depends on both the distribu-
tion of innate ability and the technology available to transform endowed innate
ability into skills used in production. Start with the same innate distribution of
ability in both countries, but let economic, institutional, or cultural factors result
in different technologies to transform ability into skill. Suppose that an agent with
ability z that goes through, say, the compulsory education system obtains eiz units
of marketable skills, i  {S, N}, where eN  eS if the North has a better education
system. Then, a uniform distribution of innate abilities in both countries with
normalized support in [0,1] leads to our assumption on the distributions of skills,
after normalizing eN  1 and letting eS/eN 1. Generally, any technology
that results in skills that are proportional to the level of ability will imply
distributions of skills with supports that overlap only for low skill levels. Some of
our results will depend on this property of the distribution of skills. See Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg [2005] for a framework in which agents can choose the
amount of skills given their innate ability.
41 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYdispersed. This higher skill dispersion will lead to higher mea-
sured within-worker wage inequality. We call this effect the oc-
cupational choice effect.
A characteristic of this equilibrium is that, because of posi-
tive sorting, more skilled managers lead teams with more skilled
workers. Since the size of a ﬁrm is uniquely determined by the
skill levels of its workers and by an economywide parameter h,
higher skilled agents work in larger ﬁrms. Because managers of
these ﬁrms have more skill, they solve a larger proportion of the
problems they face, and so these ﬁrms are more productive: the
average product of labor is higher. As we will now see, this will
result in both managers and workers in these teams earning
more per unit of skill; the wage and rent functions will be convex
in the level of skill (see also Theorem 1 above).
Equation (2), together with wS(z* S)  RS(z* S), implies that
the equilibrium wage function is given by




hz* S1  1⁄2hz* S
1  h  hz* S
.
The slope of the wage function, the marginal return to skill for
workers, is thus given by
w Sz  	S  hz.
Hence the wage function is convex: the marginal return to skill
increases with the skill level. This force is captured by the qua-
dratic term 1⁄2hz
2, and it reﬂects the imperfect substitutability
between workers of different skill—the skill price per unit of skill
varies with the skill level. Throughout the paper we refer to this
force as the complementarity effect. There is a second determi-
nant of the marginal return to skill, the one given by 	S, which is
determined by the supply and demand of worker skill in equilib-
rium: the competition effect.
The marginal return to skill can be shown to be an increasing
function of h. As communication costs decrease, given the thresh-
old z* S, team size increases. Since the difference between the skill
levels of the managers of two different workers will be smaller the
larger are team sizes, complementarity between worker and man-
ager skills implies a decrease in the marginal return to skill: a
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second effect resulting from lower communication costs reducing
the demand for workers’ skills, which reduces their baseline
price: a decrease in the competition effect.
The marginal return to skill is also increasing in , since 	S
is an increasing function of z* S which in turn increases with .I n
this case the complementarity effect is unchanged. In contrast,
the competition effect increases: since agents are more skilled,
there are too few workers per manager at the old threshold, which
requires raising workers’ return to skill in equilibrium. Again,
workers are matched with better managers, and this increases
the returns to their own skill.
After solving for the distribution of wages, we turn next to
the analysis of managerial rents. From equation (1) managerial







Using the envelope condition, the marginal return to skill for
managers is given by
R Sz  1/h1  mS
1z.
Given that the assignment function is increasing (positive sort-
ing), the rent function is convex: the marginal return to skill for
managers increases with their skill level (see Theorem 1 above).
Note also that the marginal return to skill for managers is equal
to the number of workers in their team. Hence, every time we
derive conclusions about ﬁrm size, the same applies for the mar-
ginal return to skill of managers.
A worker of ability z works for a manager with ability m(z).
This means that the total output produced by this worker is given








26  3h  hz* S.
It is easy to verify that YS decreases with h and increases with .
The reasoning is simple: the larger is h, the higher are commu-
16. Equivalently, output may be calculated as the integral over managerial
skill of the production function, n(m
1(z))z. Both expressions yield the same
result, as one results from a change of the variable of integration in the other.
43 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYnication costs, the less managers can leverage their knowledge,
and the lower is the implied average productivity. As  increases,
the average skill level in the economy increases, which also leads
to larger output.
III. EQUILIBRIUM IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
Consider a world economy formed by the two countries de-
scribed above, North and South. In the world equilibrium, agents
can form production teams with agents in their own country or
with agents in the other country. We assume that the cost of
communicating the solution to a problem, h, is the same whether
communication happens between agents in the same or in differ-
ent countries.
17
The equilibrium in the world economy is similar to an equi-
librium in the individual countries once we adjust the distribu-
tion of talent in the population. The distribution of skills in the
world population is given by the sum of the distribution of skills
in the South and in the North (and so it is not a probability
distribution since it integrates to 2), namely,
gWz 
(1  )/ if 0  z  
1i f   z  1.
The construction of an equilibrium in this economy parallels the
one for a closed economy with one caveat. Since the density of
skills in the world is not continuous, the derivative of the assign-
ment function is not continuous. However, an equilibrium alloca-
tion must be such that the earnings function is continuous and
differentiable for all z except at the threshold that divides work-
ers and managers, at which it is not differentiable, just as in the
closed economy. If this condition was not satisﬁed, some manag-
ers and workers would have incentives to form new teams. This
implies that the assignment function is continuous and Theorem
1 applies unchanged for the world economy.
17. We could add an extra cost of communicating with agents in another
country. However, this extra cost would then inﬂuence the formation of interna-
tional teams directly and would open a wedge between wages in different coun-
tries, thereby greatly complicating the analysis of the economic forces in the
equilibrium of our setup. Furthermore, this added complexity would be associated
with relatively small gains in terms of new results or economic insights, unless we
allowed for multiple layers of management within a ﬁrm. We develop some of
these extensions in Antra `s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg [2006]
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are two types of equilibria in the world. The ﬁrst one is an
equilibrium in which all agents in the South are workers. Since
there are no managers in the South, all of them work for northern
managers. That is, they all work in international teams. Positive
sorting implies that, because they are the lowest quality workers
in the world (there is an identical set of workers in the North plus
some more skilled ones), they work for the worst managers in the
North. Hence, international teams are associated with the worst
workers and managers in the world. We call this the Low Quality
Offshoring Equilibrium (LQE).
The second type of equilibrium is one in which some of the
agents in the South are managers. This equilibrium features the
less skilled workers in the South working for southern managers,
and the more skilled ones working for the best managers in the
North. We call this the High Quality Offshoring Equilibrium
(HQE).
18 All our results are derived under the assumption that
international teams are formed only if managers strictly prefer to
hire foreign workers than domestic ones.
19
In general, the set of parameter values that determines the
boundary between these two equilibria is a nonlinear function of
h and  that we will determine below, and which we plot in
Figure I. We analyze each equilibrium in turn.
III.A. Low Quality Offshoring Equilibrium
Denote by z* WL the threshold that separates the ability of the
agents who choose to be workers or managers in a LQE. In order
for the world equilibrium to be a LQE, it must be the case that
z* WL (i.e., all agents in the South are workers). For an
assignment to satisfy the world labor market equilibrium condi-
tion it has to satisfy (3) or, in this case,
mz 
((1  )/)h(1  z)i f 0  z  
h1  z if   z  z* WL.
Equilibrium in the labor market also implies that m(0)  z* WL
and m(z* WL)  1. In order for the wage function to be differen-
tiable (see (2)), the assignment function has to be continuous at
18. In Section V we will deﬁne a precise measure of offshoring quality, and we
will show that in a LQE the quality of offshoring is always lower than in a HQE,
thus justifying the names chosen for the two types of world equilibria in our setup.
19. We are effectively selecting the equilibrium with the least amount of
offshoring. This is analogous to the approach in Helpman [1984].
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equilibrium allocation provides another boundary condition of the
problem. Using the two differential equations and the three
boundary conditions, we can solve for the assignment function,
(9) mWLz 
z* WL  ((1  )/)hz(1  1⁄2 z) if 0  z  
z* WL  h(1  1⁄2 )  hz(1  1⁄2 z) if   z  z* WL,
as well as for the threshold
(10) z* WL 
1  h  1  h
23  
h .
Again, simple differentiation veriﬁes that z* WL, the set of workers
in the world, decreases with h and increases with , where the
intuition is similar to the one for the closed economy. Note that
the assignment function is continuous, but not differentiable, at .
In order for the world to be in a LQE, we need to guarantee
that z* WL or
(11) h  21  /2    
2.
The right-hand side of the inequality is decreasing in  and is
equal to zero for 1 and equal to one for 0. This condition,
FIGURE I
Types of Equilibria
46 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSwith equality, is the curve that separates the parameter set
where we obtain each equilibrium and that was plotted in Figure I.
Maximization of rents by managers implies that wages have
to satisfy (2). Furthermore, in order for agents not to have incen-
tives to join other ﬁrms in the economy, which would be willing to
hire them, we also know that the earnings function has to be
continuous. In particular, the wage function has to be continuous
at  and wages and rents have to be equal at z* WL. The latter
condition is given by wWL(z* WL)  RWL(z* WL). Combining all
these conditions, we obtain
(12) wWLz

z* WL  	1L(1  z)  1⁄2 ((1  )/)hz
2 if 0  z  
z* WL  h(1  1⁄2 )  	2L(1  z)  1⁄2 hz
2 if   z  z* WL,
where
(13) 	1L 
hz* WL1  h  1⁄2 hz* WL  1⁄2 h
2
1  h  hz* WL
and
	2L  	1L  h.
Note that at z* WL,
w WLz* WL 
1  wWLz* WL
1  z* WL

1
h  R WLz* WL,
for h  h* (see the proof of Theorem 1). Hence, the earnings
function has a kink, a nondifferentiability, at z* WL. This implies
that, given that the wage and rent functions are convex, the
marginal return to skill is larger for managers than for workers.
Figure II summarizes what we have discussed about a LQE.
Agents with skill in [0,] in the South and North work for north-
ern managers with skill in [z* WL,mWL()]. Agents in the North
with skill in [,z* WL] work for managers in the North with skill in
[mWL(),1]. The wage function of all workers in the world, and
the rent function of northern managers, is a continuous and
differentiable function of skill. The marginal return to skill of
managers is larger than that of workers.
III.B. High Quality Offshoring Equilibrium
A HQE is such that the highest skilled agents in the South
decide to become managers. If we denote by z* WH the threshold
47 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYthat divides occupations, in a HQE it must be the case that z* WH 
. Positive sorting implies that, since managers in the South are
some of the lowest skill managers in the world, they are matched
with the lowest skilled agents. In particular, they are matched
with agents in the set [0,z], where the threshold z is deﬁned by
the worker type that works for the best agent in the South,
namely, m(z)  . Agents with skill lower than z work for
managers in their own country (since we focus on the equilibrium
with the least amount of offshoring), and workers with skill
greater than z work in international teams. Then, labor market
clearing implies that
m WHz 
h(1  z)i f 0  z  z
((1  )/)h(1  z)i f z  z  z* WH,
which restates condition (3) for this case, together with the same
boundary conditions as in the LQE: m(0)  z* WH and m(z* WH) 
1. On top of this we have to guarantee again that the equilibrium
assignment function is continuous, in particular at z, in order for
the wage function to be differentiable. These conditions then
result in an equilibrium assignment function given by
FIGURE II
Low Quality Offshoring Equilibrium
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z* WH  hz(1  1⁄2 z) if 0  z  z
z* WH  (1/)hz(1  1⁄2 z)
 ((1  )/)hz(1  1⁄2 z) if z  z  z* WH,
and a threshold
(15) z* WH 
1  h  1  h
2  1  /1  2h
h .
One can verify again that z* WH is decreasing in h and increasing
in . Using the deﬁnition of z, we also obtain that
(16) z  1  1  2
  z* WH
h .
It is straightforward to show that the condition that ensures that
this world equilibrium is a HQE (i.e., z* W  ) is the reciprocal of
condition (11).
Again, maximization of rents implies that condition (2) has to
be satisﬁed, together with wWH(z* WH)  RWH(z* WH) and continu-




z* WH  	1H(1  z)  1⁄2 hz
2 if 0  z  z,
z* WH  (1/)hz(1  1⁄2z)  	2H(1  z)
 1⁄2 1  /hz




hz* WH1  1/hz  1  /2hz* WH  1/2hz
2
1  h  hz* WH
and
	2H  	1H  h/z.
As in the LQE, it is easy to show that the marginal return to skill
is increasing in the level of skill and is larger for managers than
for workers.
Let us summarize what we have shown for the HQE using
Figure III. Agents with skill in [0,z] work in national ﬁrms for
managers with skill in [z* WH,]. Agents with skill between z 
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1() and z* WH work for northern managers with skill in [,1].
This set of managers includes the ones that manage international
teams. As before, the earnings function is continuous and differ-
entiable everywhere except for z* WH in which its slope increases
discreetly.
IV. EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION
We study here the impact of an exogenous policy or techno-
logical change, that we call globalization, and that allows for the
formation of international teams. We analyze its effects on the
composition of teams, occupational choices, and the rewards
structure of the economy. To do so, we compare the world equi-
librium of Section III with the autarkic equilibria in the North
and South that we described in Section II.
IV.A. Matching, Occupational Choice, and Firm Characteristics
To compare the open and autarkic equilibria, we use Figure
IV. The ﬁgure presents the matching functions in autarky and
FIGURE III
High Quality Offshoring Equilibrium
50 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSFIGURE IVa
Matching before (mN(z), mS(z)) and after (mW(z)) globalization in a LQE
FIGURE IVb
Matching before (mN(z), mS(z)) and after (mW(z)) globalization in a HQE
51 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYthe two types of world equilibria. The blending of the two skill
distributions produces a rearrangement of the matches for both
northern and southern workers. Independently of the equilibrium
we are studying, all workers in the South strictly improve their
match. This is the case even for southern workers who do not
match with international managers, since some southern man-
agers become workers in international teams, and the absence of
these managers increases the quality of the match of every
worker. Agents who were managers before globalization may
either become workers (as there is a supply of higher quality
managers who can do their problem solving job better) or remain
as managers. In the latter case, they are matched with lower skill
workers, precisely because some of the southern managers who
were previously managing low quality workers have become
workers, and the remaining managers are left to hire lower qual-
ity agents. In other words, while workers always beneﬁt from the
higher quality managers available for matching, managers’
matches suffer from the increasing competition of better interna-
tional managers.
The picture is considerably different for workers in the
North. The key change is in the opportunities of the middle-
skilled agents in the North. Previously, they were not “good
enough” to be team managers. After globalization, there is a set of
low-skilled agents who need managing. As a result, some of these
marginal workers become managers of low skilled agents. This
implies that matches of northern agents with sufﬁciently low skill
necessarily become worse. However, the highly skilled workers in
the North now have less competition, since some of their highly
skilled competitors, particularly the ones who were previously
matched with the best northern managers, have become manag-
ers. Hence, as we show formally in Proposition 1 and illustrate in
Figure IV, there is a skill level 
 below which workers have worse
matches, while above it northern workers improve their matches.
The following proposition formalizes these results.
20
PROPOSITION 1. Globalization has the following effects on team
formation:
20. When the distinction between LQE and HQE is not relevant, we denote
variables in the world economy with a subscript W. We follow this notation for all
variables and functions.
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managers both increase, i.e., z* S  z* W  z* N;
(ii)( a) Southern workers who were already workers are
matched with a better manager;
(b) Southern managers who remain managers are
matched with worse workers;
(c) Southern managers who become workers are
matched with a northern manager;
(iii)( a) There exists a unique threshold 
 such that all
northern workers who remain workers with z 

are matched with a worse manager, while those
with z 
are matched with a better manager;
(b) All northern managers who were already managers
with z  mW(
) are matched with a better worker,
while those with z  mW(
) are matched with a
worse worker.
Part (i) of Proposition 1 implies that globalization leads to the
creation of routine (worker) jobs in the South and to their de-
struction in the North. Similarly, if ﬁrms are identiﬁed by the
managers who run them, we can conclude that globalization leads
to ﬁrm destruction in the South and to ﬁrm creation in the North.
Parts (ii) and (iii) in turn imply that the size of the largest ﬁrms
in the North decreases, while some other ﬁrms will become
larger, since some managers in the North improve their match. In
contrast, all businesses based in the South that remain alive
shrink. This leads to the following corollary.
COROLLARY 1. Globalization leads to routine job creation and ﬁrm
destruction in the South, and to routine job destruction and
ﬁrm creation in the North. Furthermore, it compresses the
support of the size distribution of ﬁrms in both countries and
reduces the size of all surviving southern ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 also implies that the best workers in the South
are in international teams and thus work for the most productive
and larger ﬁrms doing business in the South. This sorting may
provide a rationale for the often-found evidence that “southern”
workers employed in multinational ﬁrms receive wages that are
on average higher than those received by workers employed in
domestic ﬁrms (see, for instance, Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey
[1996] and Lipsey and Sjoholm [2004]). More speciﬁcally, a ratio-
nale for the regression result is simply that those who hold
53 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYoffshored jobs are unobservably more skilled than those who do
not, and so they are matched with better managers.
21 In sum,
COROLLARY 2. The best workers in the South work for northern
managers and receive higher wages than southern workers
who are employed by southern managers.
IV.B. Wage Inequality, Returns to Skill, and Wage Levels
The previous subsection focused on the implications of our
theory for quantities. Corresponding to those quantities there are
equilibrium effects of globalization on prices. That is, workers’
wages and managerial earnings must be such that matches are
rearranged in the way we have described.
We ﬁrst need to propose a set of measures that will help us
characterize the effect of globalization on the distribution of
wages, and in particular wage inequality. One potential measure
of wage inequality is the ratio of the wage of the highest skilled
agent and the wage of the lowest skilled agent (e.g., w(z* W)/w(0)).
The problem with this measure is that it combines the level and
slope effects on the wage distribution in a way that is not always
straightforward to disentangle. To avoid this problem, we focus
on changes in the absolute difference between the wage of the
highest skill workers and that of the lowest skilled ones. That is,
wW(z* W)  wW(0). We will use this measure consistently every
time we talk about wage inequality.
An alternative measure of changes in wage inequality in the
context of our model is the change in the nonlinear (quadratic)
term in the wage equation. This term, which we refer to as the
complementarity effect, measures the premium that a worker
receives for possessing a particular skill level, in excess of what
several separate workers would receive for possessing the same
aggregate amount of skill. In other words, the term reﬂects the
extent to which workers with different skill levels are imperfect
substitutes in production.
These two measures directly relate changes in wages to
changes in matching. Our preferred interpretation of the empiri-
21. Controlling linearly for the skill of workers is unlikely to solve this
problem, as earnings are the result, as we showed above, of the interaction
between the skill of the worker and that of the (higher quality) international
manager. In particular, Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison [1996] only distinguish
between skilled and unskilled workers, and Lipsey and Sjoholm [2004] control
linearly for educational attainment of workers. None of these controls eliminates
the relationship between wages and multinationals generated by our framework.
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stra and Hanson [1997] and Hanson and Harrison [1999]) maps
this evidence to changes in within-worker wage inequality in our
model, since all blue-collar (unskilled) workers, but also some
white-collar (skilled) workers, should be considered workers and
not managers in our theory.
22 Of course, some white-collar work-
ers would probably be considered managers. Still, given the em-
pirical deﬁnitions of occupations, we believe that the best way to
interpret a high-skill–low-skill wage gap in our model is as the
gap between the wages of the most and least skilled workers,
which is our measure of wage inequality. We discuss, for com-
pleteness, the impact of globalization on some overall measures of
inequality at the end of this section.
23
The analysis of the impact of globalization on inequality
follows quite directly from the changes in matching. First, in-
equality within southern workers unambiguously increases. The
marginal value of workers’ skill is driven by the skill of the
manager with whom they are matched, which increases for all
southern workers. Thus, the sum of the complementarity and the
competition effects unambiguously leads to higher returns to skill
in this case. Moreover, measured within-worker inequality will
increase even more, since the mass of workers in the South
unambiguously increases (occupational choice effect).
PROPOSITION 2. Globalization increases within-worker wage in-
equality in the South. Furthermore, it increases the marginal
return to skill for southern workers at all skill levels.
Consider next the effects of globalization on northern wage
inequality. Globalization decreases the quality of the match of
those northern workers who are relatively unskilled and in-
creases it for the more skilled among them. As we could expect,
given that the marginal return to skill of all workers is a function
of the quality of the match, the returns to skill for relatively low
22. Feenstra and Hanson [1997] and Hanson and Harrison [1999] deﬁne
unskilled workers as blue-collar workers and skilled workers as white-collar
workers. White-collar workers are in charge of tasks such as management, prod-
uct development, administration, and general ofﬁce tasks. The latter three tasks
can be interpreted as worker tasks in our model. The occupational distinction in
our theory is not between blue- or white-collar workers, but between low level,
front-line, routine tasks (including white-collar tasks such as handling the calls at
a call center, or processing the back ofﬁce paper work for a bank) and specialized
problem solving, dealing with exceptions, namely, managerial tasks.
23. To our knowledge, the effect of offshoring on these measures of overall
income inequality has not been studied in the empirical literature.
55 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYskilled northern workers go down, and the returns to skill for the
more skilled ones go up. The equilibrium effect on the marginal
return to skill can again be decomposed in two. First, because
now there is more competition from workers in the South, the
baseline return per unit of skill always goes down (	1W 	 N 
0), as we can verify numerically for all parameter values.
24
Second, since there are relatively more workers with low skill
in the world than in the North, an increase in the skill level of
workers increases the quality of their managers more after glob-
alization. Thus, the complementarity effect tends to increase the
marginal return to skill. This second effect is larger the higher
the ability of the workers, since they are part of larger teams, as
long as southern and northern workers compete for the same
manager. In fact, for workers without skill, z  0, this effect is
not present so the ﬁrst effect has to dominate, and the marginal
return to skill decreases. Numerically, we can show that the
second effect dominates for workers with skill above a certain
threshold, and so the marginal return to skill increases for them.
The threshold ability at which both effects are identical is a
function of the parameters h and . The lower , the more
southern agents are being added at each skill level where workers
in both countries compete, and so the larger the set of abilities in
which the complementarity effect dominates. The lower h, the
smaller the competition effect, and so again the threshold of
abilities decreases.
In order to understand the effects on wage inequality, we
need to combine this reasoning with the occupational choice ef-
fect. In particular, the fact that after globalization fewer agents in
the North become workers, which reduces wage disparity. Nu-
merically, we can conclude that wage inequality in the North
increases when h and  are small, but decreases when these
parameters are large. As mentioned in the introduction, this
prediction is consistent with the ﬁndings of Feenstra and Hanson
[1996b, 1999], who reported a signiﬁcant positive effect of offshor-
ing on U. S. wage inequality in the 1980s, but not in the 1970s.
We summarize these results below.
24. In our two-parameter model it is straightforward to analyze numerically
different equilibrium values for a tight grid of the whole parameter space. In the
working paper version of the paper [Antra `s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg 2005],
we provide graphical illustrations of all the numerical results discussed below.
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ity in the North if h and  are sufﬁciently low, but it de-
creases it if h and  are sufﬁciently high. Furthermore,
globalization decreases the marginal return to skill of all
northern workers with knowledge z below a threshold, but
increases the marginal return to skill of all northern workers
above this threshold.
We are also interested in studying the effect of globalization
on the level of wages, which is the result of two effects: on one
hand, southern workers face more competition from low skill
northern workers; on the other hand, globalization improves their
match. In contrast, in the North, workers also face more compe-
tition, but they do not always improve their match (as described
in Proposition 1). If we focus attention on the effect of globaliza-
tion on the lowest skilled agents (for which the match deterio-
rates in the North), we can show numerically the following
results.
SUMMARY 2. Globalization has the following effects on wages:
(i) Increases the wages of low skilled southern workers for
low h and , but decreases them for high h and ;
(ii) Decreases the wages of low skilled northern workers for
low h and , but increases them for high h and ;
(iii) It decreases the wage of at least some low skilled
agents.
Our model also allows us to derive some conclusions on wage
inequality among managers in both countries. In particular, re-
member that the marginal return to skill of managers is given by
the size of their team. From Proposition 1 we know that all
managers in the South will have smaller teams and so the mar-
ginal return to skill for them decreases. Since there are also fewer
of them, within-manager income inequality in the South de-
creases. In the North, there are two opposing forces. First, from
Proposition 1 we know that the lowest skill managers, who were
in managerial positions before globalization, will have larger
teams, but the best managers will have smaller teams. This
implies that the return to skill of low ability managers increases
and that of high ability managers decreases. Second, there are
more managers in the North, so the occupational choice effect
leads to more income inequality among managers. This reasoning
leads to the following corollary of Proposition 1.
57 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYCOROLLARY 3. Globalization has the following effects on within-
manager income inequality and on the marginal return to
skill of managers:
(i) Globalization decreases within-manager income in-
equality and the marginal return to skill of all southern
managers;
(ii) Globalization increases the marginal return to skill for
northern managers with knowledge z below a threshold
but decreases it for the rest.
We now turn to analyze the predictions of the model for other
measures of inequality. The changes in within-worker inequality
in the North, together with compositional changes, suggest that
inequality is more likely to increase at the top of the northern
skill distribution than at the bottom. Intuitively, some northern
workers improve their matches, but some others suffer from
southern competition and get worse matches—thus, the increase
in within-worker inequality is moderate. However, globalization
increases the share of northern agents who are managers, and
inequality within managers is always large, since managers are
able to leverage their skill over an entire team. Indeed, we ﬁnd
numerically that inequality in the North, as given by the gap
between the earnings of the ninetieth percentile agent and those
of the ﬁftieth percentile agent (the 90/50 gap) increases for all h
and for all . In contrast, the 50/10 gap may or not increase. We
also ﬁnd numerically that the expected increase in the 90/50 gap,
where the expectation taken over all h and  (assuming uniform
distributions for both parameters) is larger than the expected
increase in the 50/10 gap. Both of these ﬁndings suggest that
offshoring may provide an explanation for the empirical ﬁnding
(see Murphy and Welch [2001] or Autor, Katz, and Kearney
[2004]) that wage inequality in the United States has stabilized
at the bottom of the distribution, but continues to grow at the
top.
25
The fact that the model allows us to characterize the whole
earnings distribution suggests that we can compute any measure
of inequality, and for instance we can study the effect of offshor-
25. Autor, Levy, and Murnane [2003] develop a model that differentiates
between routine and nonroutine tasks, where only the aggregate units of factors
enter the production function. Such a model could also potentially be applied to
study offshoring, but would miss the effect of offshoring on matching, and there-
fore, within-group wage inequality, that is central in our analysis.
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sures is unlikely since wage levels will be affected by the relative
masses of agents at each point of the distribution, and we have
shown analytically that offshoring leads to contradictory effects
on inequality within managers and within workers. We compute
the expected changes in overall inequality that globalization
brings about when the South is relatively unskilled (expectations
are taken over 0.5 and h). In the North, globalization leads to
an increase in the standard deviation of income (wages and
rents), in the 90/10 gap, and in the manager/worker gap (as
measured by the difference between the mean managerial rent
and the mean worker wage). In the South, globalization implies
an increase in the standard deviation of income and in the man-
ager worker gap, but a drop in the 90/10 gap. The reason that
these measures differ in the South is that, for a given wage
function, the ﬁrst one takes into account the relative mass of
workers to managers, while the last one does not.
26
IV.C. Production, Consumption, and Trade
As argued above, Theorem 1 applies also to the equilibrium of
the world economy, and therefore the equilibrium is unique and
efﬁcient. As a result, since in the world economy we could always
replicate the equilibrium in the closed economies of the North and
the South, we know that in our framework there are always
welfare gains from international offshoring. The following corol-
lary summarizes this conclusion.
COROLLARY 4. Globalization increases total production in the
world economy. That is, there are gains from trade.
How are these gains distributed between the countries? De-
ﬁne a country’s physical output as the quantity of goods that are
produced by its workers, since they are the ones who combine
labor and knowledge to produce. In the South, Proposition 1
implies that there are more and better matched workers and so
total physical output increases. In the North there are fewer
workers, and some of them have worse matches. We can show
numerically that, for all combinations of h and , physical pro-
duction decreases in the North. Hence, in terms of physical value
26. We ﬁnd that, when the South is relatively skilled (0.5), the same
changes take place in the North and the South, except that the manager/worker
gap decreases in the South.
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the North produces less after globalization is that physical pro-
duction does not take into account that managers’ rents have to
be repatriated. Managers consume in their own country, and they
receive—as compensation for the time spent helping and commu-
nicating with workers abroad—part of the production of these
workers. These rents can be substantial and in fact imply that
consumption in both countries increases and, since utility is lin-
ear, so does welfare.
This difference in consumption and production outcomes is
reﬂected in the trade balance of these countries. In particular, the
South features net exports of physical goods, while the North
features net exports of knowledge services.
27 Furthermore, if
knowledge transactions are not registered as imports for the
South and exports for the North, the trade balance of the north-
ern country will be in deﬁcit and that of the southern country in
surplus. This deﬁcit and surplus is, however, not evidence of an
imbalance, but just the result of the potential misrecording of
knowledge transactions. This reasoning suggests that some of
these forces may be at play when we look at the trade balance of
the United States with some of its Asian trade partners, like
China.
28 We summarize these conclusions below.
SUMMARY 3. Globalization has the following effects on physical
production, consumption, and the trade balance:
(i) It increases physical production in the South and de-
creases physical production in the North;
(ii) It increases consumption (and thus welfare) in both
countries;
(iii) The pattern of trade is such that the South exports
manufactures and the North exports knowledge
services;
(iv) If knowledge transactions are not reported, globaliza-
tion generates a trade surplus in the South and a trade
deﬁcit in the North.
27. Indeed, using mW(z)  w(z), it is straightforward to show that YWS 
CWS  0, which of course implies that YWN  CWN  0.
28. Note that this misrecording will not be evident in the capital account as
long as some of the manager’s rents are kept offshore.
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Our setup has assumed particular functional forms for the
distributions of ability. We now brieﬂy outline the robustness of
some key results to more general distributions. First, we can
show that for globalization to lead to the creation of routine jobs
in the South and to their destruction in the North (i.e., z* S  z* W 
z* N) all that is required is that the distribution of ability in the
North ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that in the South (i.e.,
GN(z)  GS(z) for all z).
Second, we note that the complementarity effect (which is





1  z ,
which highlights the close relationship between matching and
wage inequality in our setup.
29 Furthermore, if in addition to
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance we assume that the distributions





gWz for z  z  z,
then we can show that mW(z)  mS(z) and w W(z)  w S(z) for
all z  z* S. These conditions ensure that, from the point of view of
the South, globalization improves the match of all southern work-
ers (with the implications for the size distribution of ﬁrms noted
in subsection IV.A) and leads to an increase in wage inequality on
account of the complementarity effect.
Note that these conditions are only sufﬁcient not necessary,
and that they guarantee improved matches and a larger comple-
mentarity effect for all ability levels in the South. If any of these
assumptions on the distributions does not hold, it may be the case
that the complementarity effect decreases with integration in the
South. To illustrate this, consider the case where the distribu-
tions in the North and South are both uniform, but the range of
29. This characterization of the complementarity effect allows us to derive
conclusions on the wage effects of changes in population size. Consider our setup
with overlapping uniform distributions of ability. Suppose, for example, that
population size in the South increases, keeping the support of the distribution of
abilities constant, but increasing the density by the same amount for all ability
levels. Then it is straightforward to see that the ratio gW(z)/gW(mW(z)) will
weakly increase, while gi(z)/gi(mi(z)) will be unaffected for i  N, S. Thus, the
larger the population size in the South, the larger the increase that globalization
will cause, through the complementarity effect, on wage inequality.
61 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYabilities in the South is given by [0,1] and in the North by [,1],
so condition (19) is not satisﬁed. In this case there exists a  such
that for some z  [0,z* S],




1    h  w Sz.
That is, integration may lead to a decrease in the complementa-
rity effect. Note, however, that in the above example it is still the
case that GN(z)  GS(z) for all z, and thus the patterns of
specialization in the global economy are analogous to those dis-
cussed in our benchmark case.
V. COMPARATIVE STATICS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY
In this section we analyze the effect of changes in communi-
cation costs (h) and the skill overlap () on the equilibrium
outcome of the integrated economy. For brevity we only report the
impact of these changes on occupational choices, characteristics
(quantity and quality) of international offshoring, and matching.
We also discuss brieﬂy some implications of these changes for the
structure of earnings in the world economy. More details on these
comparative statics are provided in Antra `s, Garicano, and Rossi-
Hansberg [2005].
Occupational Choice. As h decreases, managers have access
to a communication technology that allows them to deal with
larger teams. As a result, the number of workers in the South
weakly decreases with h, and the number of workers in the North
decreases with h. The number of managers in the South in turn
weakly increases with h, and the number of managers in the
North increases with h.A s increases, agents in the South
become relatively more skilled. This implies that the number of
workers in the South weakly decreases with , whereas the
number of workers in the North increases. In contrast, the num-
ber of managers in the South weakly increases with , whereas
the number of managers in the North decreases with . These
conclusions are implied by the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3. The skill of the world’s most-skilled worker (z* W)i s
decreasing in communication costs (h) and increasing in the
skill overlap ().
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quantity of offshoring, we need a measure that captures the
extent to which ﬁrms in the economy are formed by national
versus international teams. Therefore, we deﬁne the quantity of
offshoring as the proportion of southern workers that work for
international teams. In a LQE, all agents in the South are work-
ers in international teams, so it follows that our measure of
offshoring equals one. In contrast, in a HQE, the quantity of
offshoring is given by
OW  z* WH  z/z* WH.
The proportion of workers in international teams is always less
than one in a HQE, but converges to one as we change parameters
to approach the boundary between both type of equilibria. Hence,
in a LQE there is always more offshoring than in a HQE.
We also want to derive conclusions on the characteristics of
the ﬁrms that engage in offshoring. For this purpose, we deﬁne
the quality of offshoring as the average skill level of the workers
that form international teams relative to the skill level of all
southern workers,
QW  z* WH  z/z* WH.
In a HQE the quality of offshoring is always larger than one and
again converges to one as we change parameter values in a way
that approaches the boundary between equilibria. Clearly, OW 
2  QW, and so the same forces that cause an increase in
offshoring will simultaneously reduce its quality. With these
measures at hand, we derive the next result.
PROPOSITION 4. The quantity of international offshoring is weakly
decreasing in communication costs (h) and the skill overlap
(). Furthermore, the quality of offshoring is weakly increas-
ing in h and .
Matching and Firm Characteristics. A fall in h improves the
skill level of the worst manager and so improves the match of the
worst workers, z  0. Conversely, the best worker before the fall
in h is now matched with a worse manager. Moreover, we can
show that the direct effect of the technological improvement on
ﬁrm size dominates these effects, thereby leading to an increase
in the size of all ﬁrms in the economy. In contrast, changes in 
have distinct effects on small versus large ﬁrms. As  increases,
workers with low skill levels will be matched with better manag-
63 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYers, and will thus work for more productive ﬁrms. Workers with
high skill levels will be matched with worse managers and so the
productivity of the ﬁrms for which they work will decrease. We
formalize these conclusions in the next proposition.
PROPOSITION 5. A decrease in communication costs (h) has the
following effects on matching and ﬁrm size:
(i) It improves the match for workers below a threshold
skill level , while it worsens the match for workers
(who were already workers) above ;
(ii) It increases the size of all ﬁrms.
An increase in the skill overlap () has the following effects
on matching and ﬁrm size:
(i) It improves the match for workers below a threshold
skill level, while it worsens the match for workers with
skill above this threshold;
(ii) It increases the size of the largest ﬁrms and decreases
the size of the smallest ﬁrms;
(iii) It increases the size of the largest offshorers and de-
creases the size of the smallest offshorers;
(iv) It increases the size of all nonoffshorers in a LQE, but
decreases the size of all nonoffshorers in a HQE.
Managerial Rents and Wages. Concerning managerial rents,
a decrease in h increases the marginal return to skill for manag-
ers, since all ﬁrms grow and the marginal return to skill of
managers is equal to ﬁrm size. The effect of  on ﬁrm size is not
the same for all ﬁrms. We can, however, conclude that the mar-
ginal return to skill of the worst managers decreases and the
marginal return to skill of the best managers increases.
Now consider the effect of changes in h and  on the wage
structure. First, the complementarity effect (the quadratic term
in both (12) and (17)) increases with h, and weakly decreases with
. The reason is that as h increases, team sizes decrease, and so
having more skill will imply matching with a much better man-
ager. In contrast, an increase in  leads to a decrease in density
for all skill levels in the South (and thus for the levels in which
northern and southern workers compete). Hence, a slightly better
worker will now match with only a slightly better manager.
Second, h has an ambiguous effect, and  increases the competi-
tion effect, as measured by the baseline unit of skill (	1L and
	1H). The latter effect follows from  increasing workers’ skills in
64 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSa LQE and making them more scarce in a HQE. Third, as shown
in Proposition 3, the occupational choice effect decreases with h




We have developed a theory of offshoring in which agents
with heterogeneous abilities sort into teams competitively. We
have analyzed the effects of globalization on the organization of
work, the size distribution of ﬁrms, and the structure of earnings
of individuals, and we have illustrated how these outcomes in
turn determine the patterns of production, consumption, and
international trade in the global economy.
We have shown that the effects of globalization interact in
nontrivial ways with the state of communication technologies.
For example, in our model globalization always increases within-
worker wage inequality in the South, but it increases within-
worker inequality in the North only if the costs of communicating
knowledge are relatively low. Similarly, we have shown that the
characteristics of international offshoring also depend very much
on the state of communication technologies: the lower are com-
munication costs, the higher is the amount of international off-
shoring, but the lower is its quality.
In order to highlight the main forces in the model, our theo-
retical framework has abstracted from certain aspects that are
central in shaping the international organization of production.
First, we have imposed that production is undertaken by two-
layer teams consisting of a manager and a set of workers. It would
be interesting to incorporate the possibility of both self-employ-
ment and multiple layers in our model. This would open the door
for a study of how globalization affects the incentives to offshore
or not to different countries, as well as the way it affects the
hierarchical structure of ﬁrms. Second, we have presented a
purely technological theory of the international organization of
production. A caveat of this approach is that we can explain why
30. The overall effect of h and  on wage inequality results from the combi-
nation of these three effects. In Antra `s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg [2005] we
show, for instance, that our model is consistent with an increase in the relative
endowment of skilled agents in the South (a higher ) leading to increased
within-worker inequality in that country. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Zhu and Treﬂer [2005] and is not easily rationalizable with standard general
equilibrium models.
65 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYa northern manager might have an incentive to form a team with
a group of southern workers, but we have less to say about why
this international exchange of knowledge will occur within ﬁrm
boundaries (i.e., within multinationals), rather than through
arm’s length subcontracting or licensing. It would be interesting
to incorporate contractual frictions in our setup in order to obtain




Proof of Theorem 1. We ﬁrst show that an equilibrium of this
economy exhibits positive sorting. Let (zm,zp) denote the rents
of a manager of ability zm and hires workers with ability zp. From
our deﬁnitions above, we know that (m(z),z)  R(m(z)) if m
is the equilibrium assignment function. In equilibrium we know














The numerator has to be negative since managers are maximiz-
















Since the argument is valid for all workers, we conclude that in
an equilibrium allocation m(z)  0 for all workers with ability z.
31. In a similar vein, Antra `s [2003, 2005] and Antra `s and Helpman [2004]
embed the property-rights approach of Grossman and Hart [1986] in standard
trade models. Grossman and Helpman [2004] in turn develop a model of the
international organization of production that shares certain features with the
multitask approach of Holmstrom and Milgrom [1994].
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M(w) be the equilibrium set of agents who become workers and
managers, respectively. Let m(z) be the skill level of the manager
of a worker with ability z, then
h
W0,zp
1  zgzdz 
Mm0,mzp
gzdz all zp  W.
Deriving with respect to zp, we obtain that, as long as zp is in the
interior of W and m(z) is increasing, as we showed above,
mzp  h1  zp
gzp
gmzp.
We want to prove that an equilibrium in this economy im-
plies that W(w) is a connected interval. Suppose that it is not. In
particular, suppose that W  [a1,a2]  [a3,a4] and M [a2,a3] 
[a4,a5]. Then, given a1 and a3, we know that m(a1)  a2 and
m(a2)  a3. Combining these conditions with the differential
equation for wages (and continuity of wages at a2) and the ex-
pression above—that have to hold in the interior of W—we can
solve for a wage function w13, a rent function R13 and a threshold
a2. Similarly, given a3 and a5, we can solve for a wage function
w35, a rent function R35, and a threshold a4 that satisfy all the
equilibrium conditions in the interval [a3,a5]. In order for W and
M to represent equilibrium occupational choices, we have to guar-
antee that agents in the interval [a3,a5] do not want to form
teams with agents in the interval [a1,a3]. The ﬁrst necessary
condition is that
R13a3  w35a3.
Since, if R13(a3)  w35(a3), agents with skill above but arbi-
trarily close to a3 would like to become managers. If R13(a3) 
w35(a3), agents with skill marginally below a3 would like to
become workers, and agents at a4 would like to hire them at a












h1  a2  1
67 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYby the envelope theorem. We will prove that the inequality above
has to hold in equilibrium in two distinct cases: for the case when
w13(a2)  a2 and for the case when w13(a2)  a2. Suppose that
w13(a2)  a2, then, since R13(z)/z  1 for all z  [a2,a3], we
know that R13(a3)  a3 and since R13(a3)  w35(a3), w35(a3) 











which proves condition (20) if w13(a2)  a2. Now suppose that
w13(a2)  a2, then, since w35(a3)  R13(a3), we can rewrite the






a4h1  a2  a3  w13a2
1  a3h1  a2 .
Proving that condition (20) holds then amounts to prove that




h1  a2 .
But this is trivially satisﬁed given that a4  z   1, and w13(a2) 
a2.
We have established that condition (20) has to hold in equi-
librium, but then a4 would like to hire a3  ε at a better wage
than what he makes as a manager, and a3  ε would accept the
offer. To show this, consider the rents that a4 would get from
hiring a3  ε at wage R13(a3  ε),
a4, a3  ε 
a4  R13a3  ε




a4, a3  ε
ε 
R 13a3  w 35a3
h1  a3  0,
where the inequality comes from the result above. Hence, an
allocation where W is not connected implies that there are incen-
tives for agents to form different teams. This implies that an
68 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSequilibrium requires that W be a connected interval of the form
[0,z*]. Hence, in equilibrium m(0)  z*, and m(z*)  z .A n
allocation that (i) satisﬁes the two differential equations above,
(ii) satisﬁes the previous boundary conditions for assignment
function m, and (iii) yields a continuous earnings function, exists
and is unique (see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg [2005]).
The ﬁnal step is to prove that such an allocation is in fact an
equilibrium. For this we need to prove that there exists an h* 
0 such that the allocation guaranteed to exist by the above rea-
soning is such that R(z*)  w(z*). To show this, we use a
similar argument to the one above. Consider the incentives of a
manager with ability z  to hire a worker with ability z*  ε. Her
proﬁts are given by
z , z*  ε 
z   Rz*  ε




z , z*  ε
ε 
wz*  Rz*
h1  z* ,
since R(z*)  w(z*). Hence, in equilibrium it has to be the case
that R(z*)  w(z*) in order for this term to be negative. But
notice that, since R(z*)  w(z*),
wz* 
z   wz*
1  z* 
hz   z*  w0
1  z*h ,
which is smaller than 1/h if hz   w(0)  1. Hence, since w(0) 
1 (if not rents of all managers would be negative), this implies
that there exists an h*  0 such that for all h  h*,
wz*  1/h  Rz*.
Hence, for all h  h*, there exists a unique competitive equilib-
rium in this economy. Given that markets are complete and
competitive, this implies that the equilibrium allocation in the
economy is Pareto optimal.












where the last inequality follows from positive sorting. ■
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) We ﬁrst show that the mass of
workers increases in the South. This is obviously the case in a
LQE, because z* S z* WL.
32 On the other hand, for the case of
a HQE, it sufﬁces to show that z* S  z* WH, but this follows from
simple inspection of the formulas for these thresholds. That the
mass of workers decreases in the North follows from z* WH  z* N
and z* WL  z* N, which are both clearly true from the expressions
for these thresholds.
(ii) For the ﬁrst statement we want to show that both
mS(z)  mWL(z) and mS(z)  mWH(z) for all z  z* S. The ﬁrst
inequality follows directly from z* WL  z* S in a LQE. Similarly,
z* WH  z* S immediately implies that mS(z)  mWH(z) for z  z.
For the interval z  z  z* WH, it is useful to rewrite mWH(z)a s
mWH(z)  hz(1  1⁄2 z)  z* WH  (1/)h[z(1  1⁄2 z)  z(1 
1⁄2 z)]. The inequality then follows from z* WH  z* S and the fact
that x(1  1⁄2 x) is nondecreasing in x for x  [0,1]. The second
statement is an immediate corollary of this ﬁrst result. For the
third statement, it is sufﬁcient to show that mWH(z* S) for all
z* S  z  z* WH. But notice that with a couple of substitutions,
mWH(z* S) ((1  )/)(z* WH  z* S)  , and the result
follows from the monotonicity of mWH.
33
(iii) To prove the ﬁrst part, we simply write mW(z)  mN(z)
for each of the two equilibria. For the LQE one, this equals
mWLz  mNz 
z* WL  z* N  (h/)z(1  1⁄2z) if 0  z  
z* WL  z* N  h(1  1⁄2) if   z  z* WL,
which is nondecreasing in z, is negative for low enough z and is
positive for high enough z (notice that z* WL  z* N  h(1  1⁄2 ) 
0 is implied by mN(z* WL)  1). For the HQE case, this equals
32. There are parameter values for which z* S  z* WL, but these are inconsis-
tent with the existence of a LQE.
33. Notice that mWH(z* S)  hz* S(1  1⁄2 z* S)  z* WH  (1/)h[z* S(1 
1⁄2 z* S)  z(1  1⁄2 z)]. The two substitutions are hz* S(1  1⁄2 z* S)  z* S and
hz(1  1⁄2 z)  z* WH  .
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
z* WH  z* N if 0  z  z
z* WH  z* N  (1/)hzp(1  1⁄2 zp)
 (1/)hz(1  1⁄2z) if z  z  z* WH,
which is again nondecreasing in z, is negative for low enough z,
and is positive for high enough z (the latter is implied by
mN(z* WH)  1). The second part follows immediately, since the
matching functions are monotonic and thus invertible. That is, at
the same point at which workers are matched with better man-
agers, managers are matched with worse workers. See Figure IV
for an illustration. ■
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us start with the last claim. The
difference in the marginal return to skill in the South with and
without globalization is given by
	1L	Sh/z if 0  z   and h  21  /2    
2,
	1L	Sh if   z  z* S and h  21  /2    
2,
	1H	S if 0  z  z and h  21  /2    
2,
	1H	Sh/zz if zzz* S and h  21  /2    
2.
It is thus sufﬁcient to show that 	1L 	 S and 	1H 	 S. That 	1L 
	S follows directly from the expressions after realizing that z* WL  z* S
and z* WL  1⁄2 in a LQE. For 	1H 	 S, rewrite (18) as
	1H 
hz* WH1  1⁄2 hz* WH
1  h  hz* WH

h
2/2z* WH  z
2
1  h  hz* WH
 	S,
where the inequality follows since the ﬁrst term is increasing in
z* WH and z* WH  z* S, and the second term is positive. This result, com-
bined with z* WH  z* S, implies that wage inequality in the South in-
creases with globalization. ■
Proof of Proposition 3. Simple differentiation of (10) yields
z* WL
h   1  h









1  h    h  1  1  h
2  1  /1  2h
  1h
21  h
2  1  /1  2h
 0,
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1  h    h




1  2h  4h
2.
The conclusions on the set of workers and managers follow di-
rectly from this result and the deﬁnitions of a LQE and HQE.













1  1  h
2  2h1  
1  
 0.
The last two statements follow from this result as well as from the
fact that z* WH/ is decreasing in  (i.e., (z* WH/)z* WH), as
shown in the proof of Proposition 4. ■
Proof of Proposition 4. First, consider the effect of h on the
quantity of offshoring. The measure of the quantity of offshoring
is given by
OW 
1i f h  2(1  )/(2    
2)
1  (z/z* WH)i f h  2(1  )/(2    
2).
That is, the quantity of offshoring is the proportion of southern
workers in international teams. The quantity of workers engaged
in offshoring is in turn given by  in a LQE and by z* WH  z in
a HQE. We ﬁrst prove the ﬁrst statement of the proposition,
namely, that z* WH  z is a decreasing function of h. Toward a
contradiction, suppose that z* WH  z is a weakly increasing
function of h. Then, the number of workers hired by northern
managers in [,1] weakly increases with h. But as we show below
in the proof of Proposition 5, ﬁrm size (given by 1/h(1  mWH
1 (z)))
is decreasing in h for any skill level zm of the manager. Hence,
since the number of managers in [,1] has not changed, the
number of workers in their ﬁrms must have gone down: a con-





72 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSMoving to the ﬁrst statement of the proposition, notice that





and thus z/zW is increasing in h. This in turn implies that the
quantity of offshoring is weakly decreasing in h.
We now turn to the effect of  on the quantity of offshoring.
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2  h
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2  1  0,
which is clearly true. Hence,
z/z* WH
  0,
73 OFFSHORING IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMYwhich implies from the deﬁnition of OW that the quantity of
offshoring is strictly decreasing in .
Finally, we want to show that the measure of workers en-
gaged in offshoring also decreases with ; that is,
z* WH  z/
  0.
















2h1  z1 
z* WH




2h1  z1 
z* WH




2h1  z1 
z* WH
     z* WH  0,
where we have used twice that z* WH  (z* WH/) as well as
mWH(z)  . ■
Proof of Proposition 5. From Proposition 3, a decrease in h
increases z* W, say from z* W0 to z* W1. From the boundary condition
mW(0)  z* W, it follows that the worst agent is matched with a
better manager. Similarly, the boundary condition mW(z* W)  1
implies that the match for workers with zp  z* W0 worsens. It
remains to show that the change in the match is a monotonic
function of the skill of the worker. But simple inspection of the
formulas for mWL(zp) and mWH(zp) reveals that 
2mWL(zp)/
hzp  0 because zp(1  1⁄2 zp) is increasing in zp. To prove the
second claim, we need to show that h(1  mW
1(zm)) increases in
h for all zm in [z* W,1]. This amounts to computing these partial
derivatives for each segment of each equilibrium and showing
that they are positive. Simple but tedious derivation then con-
ﬁrms the ﬁrst result.
To understand the effect of changes in , note that making
use of the boundary conditions as well z* WL/  0, it is straight-
forward to see that the least-skilled worker is matched with a
better manager, while the ex ante most-skilled worker is matched
with a worse manager. For claim (i), it remains to show that the
change in the match is a monotonic function of the skill of the
74 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICSworker; i.e., 
2mW(zp)/z  0. Again, this is clear from inspec-
tion of the formulas for mWL(z) and mWH(z) because z(1  1⁄2 z)
is increasing in zp. Hence, for each equilibrium, there exist a
thresholds i  z* Wj, j  H, L, such that all workers with z  j,
are matched with a better manager, while all workers with z  j
are matched with a worse manager.
A corollary of this result is that all managers with skill below
mWj(j) are matched with lower-skilled workers, while all man-
agers with skill above mWj(j) are matched with higher-skilled
workers. This immediately delivers claim (ii) because remember
that ﬁrm size is the inverse of h(1  mW
1(zm)).
For claims (iii) and (iv), notice that 
2mWL(z)/z  0 for
z  z* WL which implies (given the effect on the boundary
agents) that 0  L  . Similarly, 
2mWH(z)/z  0 for 0 
zp  z implies that z  H  z* WH. By the monotonicity of
mW(z), these inequalities in turn imply z* WL  mWL(L) 
mWL() and mWH(H)  1. To see that this is sufﬁcient for
claims (iii) and (iv), simply remember that the interval of man-
agers that offshore in each equilibrium is (z* WL,mWL()) and (,
1), respectively; while the interval of nonoffshorers is (mWL(),1)
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